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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
KENT KARL KIRKWOOD : Case No. 20010321-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting Mr. Kirkwood's prior robbery 
conviction without scrupulously examining the circumstances surrounding that crime. 
The State glosses over the trial judge's omission and argues, instead, that Mr. Kirkwood 
waived his challenge to the admission of the prior conviction because he failed to create 
an adequate record for appeal by testifying below. Utah law does not require criminal 
defendants to testify nor should it since Rule 404(b) raises none of the concerns that 
courts have identified with the admission of impeachment evidence under Rule 609. 
Moreover, the policies behind requiring defendants to testify are faulty and they infringe 
on significant constitutional rights. In any event, assuming trial judges conduct 
scrupulous examinations, an adequate record will exist for this Court to review Rule 
404(b) decisions. 
The absence of a scrupulous examination of the robbery conviction prevented the 
trial judge from determining whether (1) the State offered that conviction for a non-
character purpose; (2) the prior conviction was relevant to proving intent in this case; or, 
(3) the robbery conviction was unfairly prejudicial. The trial judge's decision 
undermined the jury's verdict because the jury expected Mr. Kirkwood to testify and only 
he could explain that he used the knife as a tool. Accordingly, Mr. Kirkwood requests 
this Court to remand this matter for a new trial. 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE NEGLECTED HIS DUTY TO 
SCRUPULOUSLY EXAMINE THE PRIOR CONVICTION 
BEFORE ADMITTING IT 
The State does not dispute that the trial judge failed to scrupulously examine the 
facts surrounding the robbery conviction before admitting it. Rather, it argues in a brief 
footnote that "any paucity of detail [about the prior conviction] is attributable solely to 
defendant, who ultimately declined to testify and risk cross-examination." State's Brief at 
17 n.4. The State, thus, blames Mr. Kirkwood for the trial judge's failure to examine the 
circumstances surrounding the robbery conviction. 
The State made an identical argument in State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, 32 
P.3d 976. ] There, the State asserted that the defendant had the burden of proving 
]Both this Court's official opinion in Webster and the reported decision in the 
Pacific Reporter appear to incorrectly cite this Court's decision as 2000 UT App 238. 
That citation actually refers to this Court's memorandum decision in State v. Arvizo. 
Because, this Court decided Webster on August 9, 2001, the correct citation for that case 
should be 2001 UT 238. 
2 
sufficient dissimilarity between the prior act and the charged conduct to avoid admission 
of the act. Id at 1J34 n. 11. Rejecting that claim, this Court held that n[i]t is the part} 
seeking admission of the bad act evidence that has the burden of proving11 admissibility. 
Id. The responsibility for failing to raise the details of the robbery conviction rests 
squarely on the State, not Mr. Kirkwood. 
Moreover, Utah courts have repeatedly pronounced that "trial judges must 
'scrupulously1 examine [prior act] evidence before it is admitted." State v. Widdison. 
2001 UT 60,1J42, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, Tfl8, 993 P.2d 
837) (emphasis added); see also State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, Tf54, 435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
The trial judge below had a duty to obtain and examine the facts of the robbery conviction 
before deciding whether to admit it. The trial judge made no attempt to do so. This 
failure constituted an abuse of discretion. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, f 11, 32 P.2d 976. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS TO TESTIFY TO PRESERVE A 
CHALLENGE TO PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE WHEN 
THE REASONS BEHIND SUCH A REQUIREMENT ARE 
BASELESS AND THEY IMPLICATE BASIC DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
The State further seeks to avoid the scrupulous examination requirement by 
requesting this Court to create a new rule requiring criminal defendants to testify at trial 
before allowing them to challenge the admission of prior act testimony on appeal. State's 
3 
Brief at 10-16. Utah law does not impose such a requirement. Rather, criminal 
defendants need only testify to preserve challenges to the admission of a prior conviction 
for impeachment purposes under Rule of Evidence 609. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 
38, 41 (1984); State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987). Sound reasons support 
treating these rules differently. 
A. Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609 Raise Different Concerns 
and the Concerns Raised Under Rule 609 Have No 
Application to Prior Act Evidence 
This Court recognized the distinction between Rules 404(b) and 609 in State v. 
Taylor. 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). There, the defendant challenged on appeal 
the admission of a prior arrest and conviction under both rules. IdL at 568 n.4. Citing 
Gentry, this Court refused to review the defendant's Rule 609 challenge because the 
defendant failed to testify at trial. Id. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that the defendant's 
failure to testify had no effect on the Rule 404(b) challenge and went ahead and addressed 
that claim. Id.2 
This Court correctly distinguished between these two rules because they serve 
significantly different purposes. Rule 609 allows for the admission of a prior conviction 
2In State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484, 489-90 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court 
overruled the correctness standard of review applied in Taylor. That Court later overruled 
Doporto and established an abuse of discretion standard of review in State v. Decorso, 
1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, which presently controls today. The change in standards 
of review has no effect on this Court's decision to address the Rule 404(b) claim. 
4 
to impeach a testifying witness's credibility. Luce reflects the concern that a defendant 
could "plant11 reversible error by requesting the trial court to exclude impeachment 
evidence under Rule 609 and then appeal the denial of such a request following 
conviction even though the defendant had no intention of testifying at trial. 469 U.S. at 
42. The United States Supreme Court sought to avoid such a situation especially when 
the ruling on the impeachment evidence had no bearing on the trial at all. 
The admission of prior bad act evidence under Rule 404(b) operates very 
differently. The State can seek admission of that evidence regardless of whether the 
defendant testifies. Thus, as a general policy matter, the concerns for sandbagging do not 
arise under Rule 404(b). 
Although the trial court conditioned the admission of the prior use of a knife on 
Mr. Kirkwood's testifying, that similarity to impeachment evidence under Rule 609 has 
no application to Rule 404(b) evidence. The trial judge erred in ruling that Mr. 
Kirkwood's act of testifying rendered the prior use of a knife more relevant. R. 188: 72. 
The prior act was either admissible on its own merits or it was not regardless of whether 
Mr. Kirkwood testified. See Appellant's Brief at 19-20. 
The trial judge similarly erred in reasoning that, unlike Officer Hansen, Mr. 
Kirkwood was a competent witness to testify about the prior use of a knife because he had 
"personal knowledge" of that act. R. 188: 72. Prior act evidence does not become 
admissible because a person has personal knowledge of the prior act. Rather, it must first 
5 
meet the test for admissibility and not simply establish a propensity to commit crime. 
State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, ^ [20, 993 P.2d 837. There is no legal basis for conditioning 
the admission of prior act evidence on the defendant testifying. Thus, in this respect, 
Rule 404(b) bears no resemblance to Rule 609. 
B. Requiring Defendants to Testify to Preserve Challenges to 
Prior Act Evidence Lessens the State's Burden of Proof, 
Unfairly Penalizes Defendants, and Violates the Right to 
Appeal 
Unlike impeachment evidence under Rule 609, applying Luce to Rule 404(b) also 
implicates basic constitutional rights. The State frequently uses prior act evidence to 
prove the elements of a crime. Here, for example, the State sought to admit the robbery 
conviction to prove that Mr. Kirkwood intended to possess the knife as a weapon. R. 
188: 49, 53. Thus, the admission of the robbery conviction would have essentially 
lessened the State's burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
noted, prior crimes evidence has a "powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact" about 
the elements of a crime. State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, Tfl5, 992 P.2d 951. This Court 
should proceed cautiously before adopting any procedural hurdle that facilitates unjust 
convictions. 
Requiring criminal defendants to testify further violates due process because it is 
6 
patently unfair. Luce "'forces upon an accused what is arguably an unfair choice; testify 
under circumstances where it is virtually certain the prosecutor will regale the jury with 
tales of prior convictions, or refrain from testifying, deprive the jury of the accused's side 
of the story, and lose all chance to appeal.'1' James Joseph Duane, Appellate Review of 
In Limine Rulings. 182 Fed R. Dec. 666, 682 (1999) (quoting Charles Alan Wright & 
Victor James Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 6119, at 123 n.49 (1993)). 
The defendant thus faces f"a grievous dilemma'" for which there is no adequate remedy. 
State McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 582-83 (Or. 1984) (quoting McCormick, Evidence § 43 at 
99 (3rd Ed. 1984)): see also American Fork City v. Crossrove 701 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 
1985) (noting the ffcruel trilemma" created in English ecclesiastical courts of forcing 
defendants to testify and answer truthfully, commit perjury, or remain silent and be found 
in contempt of court). 
This dilemma is particularly unjust when, as here, the defendant alone possesses 
information that the jury needs to acquit. Such injustices would occur if a defendant 
failed to testify no matter how egregious the trial court's evidentiary ruling may be. 
Duane, 182 Fed. R. Dec. 666 at n.72 and accompanying text. Requiring defendants to 
testify to preserve appellate challenges to bad act evidence is even more unsavory than 
doing so under Rule 609 because the State can use bad act evidence not just to impeach 
the defendant but also to prove an element of the crime charged. 
Penalizing criminal defendants in this manner for not testifying also has a "chilling 
7 
effect" on the right to appeal. State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991), cert, denied 
502 U.S. 1036 (1992). The right to appeal a criminal conviction is particularly significant 
in Utah because two explicit state constitutional provisions protect that right-Article I, 
section 12 of the Declaration of Rights and Article VIII, section 5. Applying the Luce 
rule to Rule 404(b) challenges would require criminal defendants to choose between 
testifying to preserve their appeal rights and remaining silent and forfeiting the right to an 
appeal. Duane, 182 Fed R. Dec. at 682. Penalizing criminal defendants in this manner 
defeats the purpose of an appeal "to promote justice by ferreting out erroneous 
judgments." Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980). 
The interplay of these constitutional considerations unfairly require defendants to 
choose between competing rights. Defendants who invoke the right to remain silent, 
forfeit their right to an appeal and can never remedy an unjust conviction. On the other 
hand, defendants who testify to preserve their appeal rights increase the chance of a 
conviction by inviting the admission of bad acts and thereby lessening the State's burden 
of proving every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the 
defendant may appeal an unjust conviction under this scenario, the sting of that 
conviction will still be felt through continued incarceration pending appeal and the 
consequent loss of personal liberties. 
8 
C. This Court Need Not Require Defendants to Testify Under 
Rule 404(b) Because the Concerns Under Rule 609 Do Not 
Apply and Those Concerns are Based on Erroneous 
Assumptions 
In any event, the reasoning behind requiring defendants to testify has no 
application here and it is based on faulty assumptions. Luce found as a matter of federal 
evidence law, that a reviewing court is "handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle 
evidentiary questions outside a factual context." 469 U.S. at 41. Specifically, the Court 
reasoned that without the defendant's testimony the reviewing court does not know (1) 
whether the ruling to admit the evidence actually motivated the defendant's decision not 
to testify; (2) the precise nature of the defendant's proposed testimony; (3) whether the 
trial court would have altered its ruling in light of the defendant's testimony; and, (4) if 
the prosecution would have admitted the prior conviction. Id, at 41-42. The Court further 
concluded that reviewing courts cannot properly balance the probative value and 
prejudicial impact of the evidence or conduct harmless error analysis without knowing the 
defendant's testimony. Id. at 41. 
These concerns do not arise here. The trial judge's decision to admit the robbery 
conviction specifically motivated Mr. Kirkwood's decision not to testify. Defense 
counsel informed the court and the jury during opening statements that Mr. Kirkwood 
would testify. R. 188: 25-26. But, following the trial judge's decision to admit the prior 
conviction, Mr. Kirkwood changed course based on the trial judge's decision. The State 
9 
concedes this point on appeal. State's Brief at 15. 
Even if the record did not reveal the motives behind Mr. Kirkwood's decision not 
to testify, many courts generally accept that "it is reasonable to presume11 that defendants 
would have testified had the prior conviction been excluded. State v. Whitehead. 517 
A.2d 373, 377 (N.J. 1986^: see also Commonwealth v. Richardson. 500 A.2d 1200, 1204 
(Pa Super. 1985). As some commentators have stated, "Few doubt the importance of 
testimony by the accused or the effect on defendants on a ruling that permits use of 
convictions to impeach.'1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Modern 
Evidence: Doctrine and Practice § 6.50, at 861 (1995). Admittedly, the State can admit 
bad act evidence regardless of whether the defendant decides to testify. But, the effect of 
the admission of prior bad act evidence on a defendant's decision to testify is obviously 
great given that Rule 404(b) not only allows for the admission of the fact of a conviction 
on cross-examination but also the circumstances surrounding the conviction. 
The record also reveals the content of Mr. Kirkwood's proposed testimony. 
Defense counsel stated during opening statements that Mr. Kirkwood would testify that 
he used the knife on the night stand to eat his dinner and as a tool to cut tape. R. 188: 25. 
Courts can "safely assume" that a defendant's actual testimony would be consistent with 
opening and closing statements and defense witnesses' testimony. State v. Singleton. 706 
A.2d 213, 216 (N.J. App. Div. 1998). Because "the record is adequate to permit 
meaningful review," there is no reason to apply Luce. Wickham v. State. 770 P.2d 757, 
10 
761-62 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).3 
Numerous other courts agree that when an adequate record exists, appellate courts 
will review challenges to the admission of impeachment evidence under Rule 609. 
Wickham. 770 P.2d at 761-62; Whitehead. 517 A.2d at 376-77; State v. McClure. 692 
P.2d 579, 584 n.4 (Or. 1984); Richardson. 500 A.2d at 1203. The same reasoning applies 
with greater force to Rule 404(b) issues. Assuming courts conduct scrupulous 
examinations of prior act evidence and consider the factors for admission, an adequate 
record should always exist when reviewing Rule 404(b) evidence. The concerns for an 
adequate record are more acute under Rule 609 because that rule only allows for 
impeachment by the mere fact of a conviction. In contrast, courts must thoroughly 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding a prior conviction before admitting 
evidence under Rule 404(b). Thus, the concerns for creating an adequate record do not 
apply to prior act evidence. 
Moreover, courts and commentators agree that the remaining concerns behind 
Luce are illusory. "Where a trial court denies a pretrial motion seeking to exclude an 
accused's convictions, the chance that the court will change its mind at trial is usually 
small. The chance that the prosecution will forego this highly effective evidence is 
3The State cites Page v. State. 725 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), as 
holding that criminal defendants must testify to preserve challenges to the admission of 
Rule 404(b) evidence. But, Wickham limited Page to its specific facts and clarified that 
when a record is adequate to review a Rule 404(b) claim, the defendant need not testify. 
Wickham. 770 P.2d at 761-62. 
11 
certainly even smaller." Wright & Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 6141, 
at 296-97 (1993). Once a prosecutor obtains a favorable ruling on the admission of prior 
bad acts, "there is little reason to suppose that the government will refrain from using 
them if given the opportunity." Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Modern Evidence: Doctrine and 
Practice §6.50 at 861. 
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated its view that prosecutors are 
free to change their mind about admitting prior conviction evidence. In the only time it 
has ever cited Luce, the Court held that criminal defendants waive challenges to the 
admission of impeachment evidence under Rule 609 if they attempt to remove the sting of 
a prior conviction by testifying to it on direct examination. Ohler v. United States, 529 
U.S. 753, 757-59 (2000). In support of its decision, the Court relied on Luce's contention 
that defendants do not suffer any harm until "the government exercises its option to elicit 
the testimony." Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759. But, given the minuscule chance that the 
prosecution will not admit a prior conviction, the Court's reasoning is fallacious. 
The concerns about weighing prejudice and determining harm are similarly 
unavailing. Appellate courts routinely weigh evidence and conduct harmless error 
analysis regardless of whether the defendant testified at trial. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 
Modern Evidence: Doctrine and Practice § 6.50 at 861; Duane, 182 Fed Rules Dec. at 
683. Reviewing the admission of prior bad act evidence under Rule 404(b) presents no 
more burdensome challenge than other evidentiary rulings. 
12 
Luce appears to be especially inapplicable here where the trial judge failed to 
adhere to the threshold requirement of conducting a scrupulous examination. Concerns 
about the sufficiency of the appellate record do not even arise because this Court need not 
address the trial judge's discretionary ruling given his failure to review the facts 
surrounding the robbery conviction. This omission appears to present a legal question 
amounting to an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 
238, ^[11, 32 P.3d 976; see also Duane, 182 Fed. Rule Dec. at n.98 and accompanying 
text. As the concurring opinion observed in Luce, the defendant need not testify when a 
case raises "legal and not factual considerations." 469 U.S. at 44; see also Wright & 
Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 6119, at 123; § 6141, at 293-94 
(endorsing concurring justices' view). 
Even if criminal defendants could plant reversible error by failing to testify 
following a Rule 404(b) decision, that prospect "borders on the fantastic." Duane, 182 
Fed. Rules Dec. at 683. Reversals based on the erroneous admission of prior conviction 
evidence are too rare for a criminal defendant to confidently decide to forego testifying, 
risk a conviction, and expect a reversal on appeal. Id. at n.72; State v. Whitehead, 517 
A.2d 373, 376 (N.J. 1986). "Even in the extremely rare case where a defendant can 
confidently conclude that some [evidentiary] ruling is a clear abuse of discretion, he [or 
she] could never safely give up his [or her] valuable right to testify and bank everything 
on reversal, because he [or she] would always run the horrible risk that the [appellate 
13 
court] will mistakenly fail to see any error at all." Duane, 182 Fed. Rules Dec. at 683. 
Given the sound arguments against requiring criminal defendants to testify, this 
Court should not apply Luce to Rule 404(b) claims. Applying the Luce rule to preserve a 
Rule 404(b) claim and holding that Mr. Kirkwood waived his Rule 404(b) challenge 
would allow the trial judge's glaring failure to conduct a scrupulous examination to go 
unchecked. It would also allow the admission of evidence even though the trial judge 
never considered the robbery conviction's true prejudicial impact. The due process 
concerns for fairness and requiring the State to prove all elements of a crime demand that 
this Court continue to allow criminal defendants to raise Rule 404(b) challenges 
regardless of whether they testify. 
III. NO NON-CHARACTER PURPOSE SUPPORTED 
ADMITTING THE ROBBERY CONVICTION, THAT 
CONVICTION WAS NOT RELEVANT TO PROVING 
INTENT, AND THE PRIOR USE OF A KNIFE WAS 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL 
Even had the trial judge scrupulously examined the robbery conviction, he abused 
his discretion in admitting evidence of that crime. As it did in the trial court, the State 
asserts without providing any meaningful anafysis that the mere use of a knife on a prior 
occasion f,was arguably admissible" to show Mr. Kirkwood's intent during a separate, 
unrelated incident. State's Brief at 17. As this Court found in Webster, without 
"providing] the trial court with sufficient details about the prior incident" such as when 
14 
the prior crime occurred, the type of weapon used, or how the weapon was used, the State 
cannot show that the robbery conviction was admissible for the non-character purpose of 
proving intent. State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^ [37, 32 P.3d 976. 
Likewise, the State fails to present any discussion to show how the prior use of a 
knife rendered Mr. Kirkwood's intent more probable in this case. There is no connection 
between the two incidents in time or fact. Even the trial judge concluded that the 
question of the robbery conviction's relevance was "a really close one." R. 188: 52. The 
State also does not contest that the trial judge erroneously concluded that Mr. Kirkwood 
opened the door to the admission of the prior act evidence. Rather, the prior use of a 
knife only served to show a "propensity" toward violence. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 
59, ^|15, 992 P.2d 951. The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the robbery 
conviction without learning any details about that crime. 
The absence of information about the robbery conviction further precluded the trial 
judge from balancing the factors in determining the prejudicial impact and probative 
value of the evidence. State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). The judge 
likewise failed to even consider the effect his decision would have on Mr. Kirkwood's 
decision whether to testify. People v. Sandoval 314N.E.2d413. 418 (N.Y. 1978). 
Although the jury already knew about the robbery conviction, the prejudice 
associated with the prior use of a knife was clearly more than "'slight.'" State's Brief at 
18 (quoting trial judge at R. 188: 72). The only issue to be decided below was Mr. 
15 
Kirkwood's intent in having a knife in his bedroom. Any evidence on that subject would 
obviously weigh heavily on the jury. The trial judge even observed that the evidence was 
"real prejudicial." R. 188:53. Connecting the prior possession of a weapon with a crime 
of violence (robbery) would only inflame the jury further, thus, indicating a "propensity" 
for violence. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, Tfl5, 992 P.2d 951. Given the marginal probative 
value of the prior use of a knife coupled with its significant prejudicial impact, there was 
"powerful [potential] to mislead the trier of fact." Id 
Finally, the decision to admit the robbery conviction harmed Mr. Kirkwood 
because it effectively prevented him from establishing his defense. Defense counsel 
alerted the jury that Mr. Kirkwood would explain the circumstances of his possession of 
the knife on the night stand. When Mr. Kirkwood failed to testify, it appeared to the jury 
that he could not support his defense theory. Without providing grounds for rebutting the 
State's portrayal of the evidence as giving no indication of eating or tool usage, the jury 
could not conclude that Mr. Kirkwood used the knife to eat or as a tool. The jury 
expressed a willingness to believe Mr. Kirkwood by acquitting him of possessing the 
knife in the gym bag. But, without hearing some explanation from him, such as he 
cleaned off the knife and table or that he used the knife to cut meat or tape the night 
before, the jury could not acquit him. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kirkwood requests this Court to reverse his conviction and to order a new trial 
based on the trial judge's abuse of discretion in admitting the prior act evidence. 
Dated this ;pr*May of January, 2002. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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